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There is considerable concern these days about
the prospect ofhigh and perhaps rising federal defi-
cits and theireffects on intlation, private investment
and other aspects of our economic lives. In this
paper, we will review some considerations regard-
ing the economic impact of deficits and provide
some empirical results derived from reduced form
equations for real GNP and inflation which we have
estimated.
The best known reduced fonn estimates offiscal
policy effects are those from the St. Louis equation.
In that equation, the impact offiscal actions upon
nominal GNP, when unaccompanied by changes in
the money supply, essentially disappear within four
to five quarters. A recent update by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis reaffirms these results
and also finds that fiscal variables exert no statistic-
ally significant effect in any quarter. I Thus, fiscal
policy has no significant short or long-run effect
upon nominal GNP according to these results.
Our question is whether the seeming ineffective-
ness offiscal policy will hold up in an analysis ofthe
impact of fiscal policy upon the components of
nominal GNP, that is, real GNP and inflation con-
sidered separately. Eve!} should nominal GNP be
unaffected by changes in deficits, there may be
considerable movements in real output and infla-
tion. Changes in these measures concern policy
makers and form the focus oftheoretical discussion.
The results ofouranalysis suggest thatdeficits do
have significant effects upon real output and infla-
tion. Deficits, when measured relative to their past
average values, appeartemporarily to stimulate real
output, although they have no permanent real im-
pact. This finding suggests that federal deficits ulti-
mately crowd out some private spending. Increases
in deficits also seem to raise inflation in the short
run, and the price level in the long run, as conven-
tion theory suggests. In our analysis, we measure
deficits by their high employment estimates, and
consider separately the leverage of expenditures
and revenues.
I. Theoretical Considerations
Economists are divided as to whether fiscal
actions matter in the determination of aggregate
output. Some argue along convention lines that
federal deficits, which are the result of changes in
spending or tax policies, or some combination of
these, will lead to changes in aggregate demand at
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least in the nearfuture. Many believe, however, that
deficits will have little or no impact upon aggregate
output in the long-run. Still others contend that
deficits which are matched with increases in the
national debt do not increase the nation's net wealth
and therefore will not lead to any sizable changes in
aggregate output in the short orlonger run.II. Conventional View
The model from which the conventional argu-
ment stems is the aggregate demand-aggregate sup-
ply paradigm discussed in standard economic text-
books and the foundation of several forecasting
models of the U.S. economy.2 Along the supply
schedule, greater quantities ofoutput are supplied
only at higher prices. This is because the greater
quantities of labor and other resources needed to
increase output places upward pressure on unit pro-
duction costs.
The aggregate supply schedule is derived from
the assumption ofconstant money wages and other
factor prices and a fixed stock ofbusiness plant and
equipment. According to conventional models,
money wages will increase with tighter labor mar-
ket conditions and with expectations of future in-
creases in inflation. Any increase in money wages
will shift the entire supply schedule upward and to
the left so that higher prices are associated with the
original supplies of output. Alternatively, an in-
crease in the capital stock will shift the supply curve
in the opposite direction, indicating lowerprices for
the original quantities.
The aggregate demand schedule indicates that
total demand for goods and services will be greater
at lower price levels. This occurs because lower
prices tend to ease monetary conditions and hence
to lower interest rates which in tum stimulate inter-
est-sensitivespending. Similarly, higherprices tend
to tighten monetary conditions, raise interest rates
and depress aggregate demand.
The demand schedule is derived from the as-
sumption ofconstant monetary and fiscal policy. A
change in either wili shift the entire schedule. To
clarify terms, a constant monetary policy means the
maintenance ofa given level (or rates ofchange) in
the supply of money as measured in this paper by
MI (currency and checkable deposts). A constant
fiscal policy means no change in federal gov-
ernment expenditure programs or the federal tax
structure.
An increase in federal spending or a reduction in
taxes, orany combination ofthese that increases the
federal deficit shifts the entire demand schedule
upward and to the right. This means that greater
quantities ofoutput will be demanded at the original
prices. A decrease in the deficit is associated with a
downward shift in demand and consequently with
smaller quantities ofoutput demanded at the orig-
inal prices. The same can be said for changes in
monetary policy: an increase (decrease) in the
money supply is associated with more (less) output
demanded at the original prices.
III. DeficitImpact
Given the aggregate demand and supply sched-
ules, we may now analyze the effect ofan increase
in the federal deficit, assuming no accommodating
change in the money supply, i.e., holding monetary
policy constant. This assumption is equivalent to
financing the increase in the deficit through the sale
ofbonds.
The increased deficit (due to increased expendi-
tures, reduced taxes orsome combination) shifts the
entire demand schedule upward and to the right.
Although demand rises, two important effects limit
the stimulative power of the deficit. First, the in-
creased demand tends to drive prices up, since
greaterquantities ofoutput will be supplied only at
higher prices according to the supply schedule.
Consequently, part of the expansionary effect of
fiscal spending will be dissipated in higher prices.
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Second, the increased demand for output increases
the need for greater quantities ofmoney balances to
cover the increased volume oftransactions. With a
constant monetary policy, this increased demand
for money balances will tend to tighten monetary
conditions and raise (real) interest rates. These
higher interest costs, in tum, will limit interest-
sensitive spending and the expansionary impact of
the original deficit. Real GNP, then, will tend to
increase after an increase in the federal deficit, but
the stimulative effect will be partly mitigated by
crowding out of some private spending through
higherprices and interest rates.
This behavior is illustrated in part in Figure 1.
The increase in the deficit raises aggregate demand
from DI to D2. At the original equilibrium level of
prices, PI, more output (Yl) will be demanded.Figure 1
Transitory Effect ofa Deficit Increase






But, with an upward sloping supply curve, a new
short-run equilibrium occurs at E2. As a result, the
increase in the deficit leads to higherprices (P2) and
more output (Y2) than before the change in the
deficit. However, output rises less than would have
occurred if no change in prices had taken place
(Yl).
This new equilibrium is likely to be short-lived
because the changed prices (P2) and output (Y2)
will set off a chain of reactions in factor costs and
investment that lead to further shifts in aggregate
demand and supply and which will culminate in any
one ofthree final cases.
Inthe first case, deficits havepositivesupply-side
effects increasing the economy's productive capaci-
ty. Public expenditures, for instance, may finance
projects such as road construction, rural electrifica-
tion, research and development which, on balance,
may be more productive than equal sums spent by
the private sector. Alternatively, deficits may result
from a reduction in income taxes which may in-
crease incentives to enter the work force and, on
balance, increase the supply oflabor and again, the
nation's productive resources. In these situations,
the supply curve is shifted downward and to the
right. Ultimately, more output will be produced,
and the change in the price level will be determined
by the size of the relative shifts in long-run supply
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and demand. An equal increase in both would leave
the price level the same as the original equilibrium
level while greater (smaller) increases in supply
relative to demand would lead to lower (higher)
prices than initially.
However, positive supply-side effects are not a
certain outcome. For instance, according to the
theory oflabor supply, while a lower tax rate may
encourage some people to enter the work force (an
income effect), others may be encouraged by the
highertake-home pay to spend less time at work and
more at leisure (substitution effect). As a second
case, we consider that the fiscal programs underly-
ing the deficit may have no net effect on aggregate
supply in the long-run.
In this second case, complete crowding out of
some private ,spending by federal deficits occurs.
The increased level ofoutput, (Y2) in the previous
chart, leads to increased demands for labor, tighter
labor market conditions, higher money wages and
higher prices. Furthermore, the higher prices tend
to increase expectations offuture prices. These in-
creased wage and price expectations produce an
upward shift in the supply schedule and a further
increase in final product prices. Higher prices, in
tum, reduce real money balances, tightening money
market conditions, and leading to further increases
in interest rates. As a result, real GNP is reduced
further as additional private sector spending is
crowded out ofmarkets by the combined effects of
continuing price and interest rate increases.
Economic adjustments in prices, interest rates,
wages and price expectations will continue until the
initial increase in the deficit displaces an equal
amount ofsome private sector spending. Ultimate-
ly, real output equals the level that would have
existed without the change in fiscal policy because,
as long as output is greater than it otherwise would
have been, employment will be higher and so will
money wages and prices. These higher prices,
given an unchanged monetary policy, will lead to
higher real interest rates which reduce interest-
sensitive spending. Only when aggregate output
equals the level it would have been had the deficit
not occurred will we observe no further adjustments
in employment, wages and prices.
Although complete crowding out occurs in real
GNP, it will not occur in nominal GNP. Some per-
manent effect will be left on the level of nominalGNP because the crowding out process is achieved
largely through a rise in prices and interest rates
which increases velocity and money income. 3
In the final case, deficits may ultimately lead to
a decline in aggregate supply and an increase in
prices-thecase ofsuper-crowing out. This occurs
when the reduction in private sectorspending which
the deficit crowds out of markets is replaced with
government spending that is less productive. The
increased interest costs associated with the initial
stimulative impact of deficits may .reduce private
spending on productive capital and lead to adecline
in the nation's productive resources. In this case,
deficits will raise the price level, but have an am-
biguous impact on nominal GNP.
From these alternatives-positive supply side
effects, crowding out and super-crowding out, we
observe that the ultimate effect of a deficit will
depend materially upon the particular types of
spending and/or tax policies associated with the
deficit. Deficits due to corporate tax reductions, for
instance, are likely to have a more stimulative im-
pact on aggregate supply than an equal-size deficit
that results from aid to state and local govemments
who then incur surpluses in their own budgets. In
partial recognition ofthis, we separate the effects of
spending and tax policies in ourestimations.
IV. Some Further Considerations
In formulations ofthe conventional model, indi-
viduals are assumed to change their expectations of
future prices on the basis of past price behavior.
Peo'ple, however, may be wiser and use all relevant
information to form their expectations, not just the
past behavior of inflation. Their rational expecta-
tions open further possibilities with regard to fiscal
policy effectiveness in the short run.
For example, anticipated deficits may quickly
crowd out private spending, and have little if any
impact upon real GNP in the short run. This occurs
because individuals, applying their knowledge of
the conventional model, anticipate the initial stimu-
lativeeffectsofan increaseddeficit. These anticipa-
tions are quickly incorporated in market prices and
interestrates. Theexistenceofrational expectations
suggests that we consider the different leverages of
anticipated and unanticipated fiscal deficits.
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Another case in which federal deficits may have
little real stimulative impact in the shortrun is one in
which the public does not regard the increase in the
national debt associated with the deficit as an in-
crease in its net wealth. According to this view
people will anticipate the compensating future taxes
implied by their holdings ofgovernment debt. The
important implication of this view is that federal
deficits which are bond-financed will have the saIne
impactupon aggregate demandas abalancedbudget.
Consider a tax cut and the corresponding deficit
which is financed by selling bonds to the public.
Each dollar of tax reduction is matched with an
extra dollar of federal debt that will be repaid and
serviced with future taxes with the same present
value. Since there is no change in the present value
of net tax liabilities, there will be no change in
household permanent income, net wealth orspend-
ing. The same type ofreasoning applies to federal
deficits which are the result of increased govern-
ment spending which is bond-financed.
To the extent that bonds are not net wealth, fiscal
policy will have little ifany significant impact upon
either real ornominal GNP in the short run. 5
V. Summary
According to conventional reasoning, federal
deficits are likely to have short-run stimulative ef-
fects on aggregate demand, although the size of
these effects is anempirical issue. Ultimately, in the
long run, deficits may (a) crowd out an equal
amount ofprivate sector spending, (b) crowd out a
greateramount ofprivate spending because deficits
lower the nation's capital stock, or (c) increase the
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nation's productive capacity as in the case offederal
investment in the economy's infrastructure.
Fiscal actions may have little, ifany, leverage in
the near or more distant future when individuals
equate federal deficits with future tax liabilities,
or anticipate future price and interest rate changes
caused by deficits and change market prices quickly
to conform to their expectations.VI. Estimation Model and Data
dRGNP = F(c, dMBAR, dHEBAR, dHRBAR)(lB)
dRGNP = F(c, dMBAR, dHE, dHR) (lA)
Equation (IA) states that the rate ofchange in real
GNP (dRGNP) deviates from a constant rate, c,
when money growth differs from its anticipated
rate, (dMBAR). In addition, the rate of growth in
real GNP will change with changes in real high
employment federal expenditures (dHE) and
changes in real high employment federal receipts
(dHR). In equation (lB) changes in the rate of
growth ofreal GNP occur when monetary or fiscal
policies deviate from their anticipated courses. The
dHEBAR and dHRBAR represent changes in real
high employmentexpenditures and receipts relative
to their respective anticipated rates ofchange.
Equation (2) states that changes in money growth
determine changes in inflation, reflecting earlier
considerations that both anticipated and unantici-
pated monetary changes will have an impact upon
inflation. This equation also allows changes in the
growth of real high employment expenditures
(dHE) and receipts (dHR) to determine changes in
the inflation rate. It incorporates the assumption
that both anticipated and unanticipated fiscal poli-
cies may affect the rate ofinflation.
The monetary variable is MI, currency in the
hands of the public plus checkable deposits. To
approximate unanticipated monetary changes, we
estimated dMBAR as the current rate of change in
Ml less its average rate over the past two years,
measured in logs.
The high employment budget estimates are pro-
vided by the U.S. Commerce Department. 7 The
measures we use here are adjusted to exclude the
automatic effects of inflation on revenues and ex-
penditures. There are several reasons why revenues
and expenditures respond automatically to price
changes. For example, federal interest payments
depend on interest rates which tend to change with
(2) dP = F(c, dM, dHE, dHR)
What has been the impactoffederal spending and
tax policies upon real GNPand inflation? To answer
this question, we tum to reduced form equations in
which changes in real GNP and inflation are deter-
mined mainly by changes in money growth and
changes in real federal high employment expendi-
tures and tax revenues.
These reduced form equations may be derived
from a model which was detailed in a previous
paper. 6 Underlying this model is an aggregate
demand-supply framework similarto that discussed
earlier, with the additional assumption that anticipa-
tions of future monetary and fiscal policies are de-
termined by the past history of these policies. The
real economy is assumed to be stable in the sense of
growing at a steady pace; it will depart from this
pace temporarily when either monetary and/or
fiscal policies deviate from their anticipated pat-
terns. The economy is also assumed to have the
classic long-run neutrality property associated with
money growth. This means that apermanentchange
in the rate ofgrowth ofmoney ultimately results in
an equal change in the rate of inflation, but in no
change in the rate of growth or level of real GNP.
Also, in the long-run, the leve ofprices will change
with the stockofmoney so thatthe public'sholdings
of real money balances are at desired levels, given
interest rates and the level ofincome.
The reduced-form equations (lB) and (2) below
follow directly from this model. Equation (lA) is a
more general depiction of how fiscal policy might
affect real growth for it makes no distinction be-
tween anticipated and unanticipated fiscal values.
10changes in the rate of inflation. Ifnot corrected for
such inflation-induced components, the high em-
ployment measures would provide biased estimates
ofthe economic effects offiscal policy. To approxi-
mate changes in unanticipated real high employ-
ment expenditures (dHEBAR) and receipts
(dHRBAR), we measured the currentrate ofchange
in each variable less its average rate ofchange over
the past two years, measured in logs.
VII. Empirical Results
The estimation ofequation lA, in which changes
in real GNP are determined by changes in money
from its past average (dMBAR) and by changes in
real high employment expenditures (dHE) and tax
revenues (dHR), indicated that neither ofthe fiscal
variables contributed significantly to the determina-
tion of real GNP. The results are summarized n
Table I.
This should be interpreted with some caution,
however, since there is reason to believe that the
monetary and fiscal policy measures were closely
related during the sample period. For instance, we
estimated changes in real GNP with the monetary
measures alone. These were statistically signifi-
cant, and adding fiscal policy measures did not
matter in the determination of real GNP. Con-
versely, when estimating changes in real GNP with
the fiscal measures alone, they were also significant
and adding monetary measures did not matter. Each
policy variable did about as well as the other in
IIforecasting changes with real GNP both in and
outside the sample. These results, along with the
estimation in Table I, suggestthat one type ofpolicy
served as a fairly good proxy for the other.
The close relationship among the variables
implied by these results presents an estimation
problem in that their covariance prevents us from
obtaining a very precise estimate of any indepen-
dent effects. In the case ofmonetary measures, this
was not as important and the results were still statis-
tically significant. But the case offiscal policy is, at
best, inconclusive.
We may approach this estimation problem by
respecifying the fiscal policy measures. Fiscal vari-
ables may have significant real output effects when
fiscal policy deviate~ from anticipated patterns, as
suggested earlier. This appears to be the case in the
results shown in Table 2. Both fiscal measures are
statistically significant (revenues at the 5 percent
level and expenditures at the 10 percent level) and,
together with money, account for 39 percent ofthe
variation in real GNP growth rates. According to
these results, fiscal policy has an independent and
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cyclical pattern, and ceases to have any impact
within 5 to 6 years.
The tax multipliers derived from these estimates
are illustrated in Chart 2A. The level of real GNP
steadily increases for about two and ahalfyears. By
that time, each billion dollars of the tax cut has
increased the level of real GNP by $2.4 billion.
Thereafter the impact upon the level of GNP dies
out. Within 5 to 6 years, the additional deficit re-
sulting from the tax cut has completely crowded out
some types of private expenditures not favored by
the tax reduction.
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Chart 1
Response of Annual Rates of Growth
in Real GNP and Prices to a
One Percentage Point Reduction in Real













To illustrate this, Chart 1A shows the response of
the real GNP growth rate to a I percentage point
reduction in tax revenues in the initial quarteronly.
This is equivalent to a permanent cut beginning in
1980 in constant dollar tax revenues of approxi-
mately $3.2 billion. This tax cut steadily increases
the rate of growth of real GNP from the initial
quarter to a maximum response of .3 percentage
points (annual rates) by the end of the first year.
Thereafter, the effect steadily dies out, following a





















13Charts 3A and 4A illustrate the effects on real
GNP ofa sustained $3.2 billion increase in federal
high employment real expenditures. (Again, this is
the equivalent of a 1 percentage point increase in
these expenditures in the initial quarter only.) The
real output response is somewhat less inthis case
than. in the case of tax cuts.. The real expenditure
multiplier reaches a maximum value of$1.7 billion
about 3 years after the initial change, relative to a
maximum of $2.4 billion in the former case. The
increase in federal expenditures eventually crowds
out an equivalent amount ofsome private spending
within 5 to 6 years.
Table.3 provides the inflation equation estimates.
Both.fiscal.measures are statistically significant in
these estimates. Chart 1B illustrates the impact
upon the rate ofinflation ofa sustained decrease in
real tax revenues of$3.2 billion. The inflation rate
steadily increases and reaches its maximum of .34
percentage points (annual rate) about 2 years after
the initial tax cut. Thereafter, the inflationary
response dies out, with no further impact after
Chart 3
Response of Annual Rates of Growth
in Real GNP and Prices to a One
Percentage Point Increase in Real
Expenditures in the Initial Period Only
Chart4
Response ofthe Level in Real GNP
and Prices to a One Percentage
Point Increase in Real Federal









































































Response of Nominal GNP
toaOne Percentage Point Reduction in




approximately 5 years. However, the sustained tax
cut does have a permanent effect upon the price
level, as shown in Chart 2B. The tax cut increases
the price level by 1.2 percentage points from its
initial level.
Together, Charts 2A and 2B illustrate the croWd-
ing out features ofthe initial federal deficit. The tax
cut first increases aggregate output and prices.
These price increases, in tum, act as a majorvehicle
by which othertypes ofspending not favored by the
tax cut are crowded outofmarkets. Eventually, the
initial deficit crowds out an equal ameunt of some
private sector spending and has no long-run effect
on the level of real GNP. It does, however, have a
permanent effect on the price level, and conse-
quently, on nominal GNP. The results for nominal
GNP are shown in Chart 5.
The inflationary impact ofa $3.2 billion increase
in real expenditures is shown in Chart 3B. At first,
the inflationary response is negative, but it steadily
increases to a maximum of .2 percentage points
within approximately 3 years ofthe initial spending
increase. Eventually, the inflation rate response
dies out, leaving the price level .4 percentage points
higher, as shown in Chart 4B. Together, Charts 4A
and 4B illustrate that the increased deficit crowds
out some private spending, but will permanently
raise the price level.
15VIII. Summary andiConclusions
Economists are divided regarding .whether
changes in thefederal deficitwillproduceany.sig-
nificant effects upon the total level ofreal GNP and
prices. According to conventional reasoning,. the
impact ofdeficits in the long-run dependsuponthe
particular expenditure and tax. programs which
make up the deficit. Certain govemmenttaxand
expenditure.policies may induce positive supply
side effects through incentives which incr~asethe
supply of labor, for example. Other policir
s l11
ay
transfer the nation's resources away from pro-
ductive private spending towards less efficient
government expenditures and reduce the nation's
productive capacity. This would be a case ofsl.lper-
crowding out. Another case is that of complete
crowding out, when deficits replace private sector
spending.
In any case, an increase in federal deficits initial-
ly is likely to stimulate aggregate demand. There-
after, ifsome degree ofcrowding outtakes place, it
occurs as the additional demand related to the def-
icit places upward pressures on market prices and
interest rates which, then, reduce some private sec-
tor interest-sensitive spending.
We must make a further distinction, between
anticipated and unanticipated deficits. An antici-
pated deficit may quickly crowd out private spend-
ing as the public incorporates the stimulatoryeffects
into higher market prices and interest rates. Antici-
pated deficit changes, then, may have littleeffecton
real output even though they raise prices. Unantici-
pated deficits, on the otherhand, may have dynamic
effects on real output and inflation as explained in
the conventional model.
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\Vehave found that deficitshave significant real
outputeffects whenwcITleasure changesin its com-
ponents, high employment expenditures and re-
ceipt~, r~lative totheirpastaverag~ratesofshange.
Thes~measures.111ayserve.as ciUde estimatesof
unanticipatedchanges ~in.the deficit. The real GNP
response, then, to changes in federal deficits
appears. to be.transitory,\ and in the long-run,
changesin the deficit appearto crowdoutabout an
equalamount ofs?me privatesectorspending.
Changesindeficits also appeartochange the rate
ofinflation in the shortrunand the. price levelin the
lon~er run,according to our estimates.These re-
sults are consistent with the conventionalview that
federal crowding out of private sector spending
achieved in part through higher prices.
A few final statements are probably in order. It
should be clearthat the deficitswe are addressing in
both theoretical discussions and empirical w?rk are
those best measured at high employment because
these are adjusted for automatic changes in the
deficit due to changes in business conditions. Con-
sequently, the high employment measures, more
accurately than their corresponding actual deficit
measures, depict fiscal policy initiatives which can
alter market conditions.
Lastly, we regard ourresults as tentative, atbest a
depiction of experience during the sample period
from 1966.2-1979.4. The exact timing and size of
fiscal economic effects remains uncertain subject to
a fairly wide range ofestimation error, probably in
part because historical movements in fiscal mea-
sures have been closely related to monetary growth.
This correlation may reflect responses oftherespec-
tive policy makers to unfolding economics develop-
ments ofthe past.FOOTNOTES
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